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ILLNESS AND INABILITY TO REPAY:
THE ROLE OF DEBTOR HEALTH IN THE
DISCHARGE OF EDUCATIONAL DEBT
RAFAEL I. PARDO∗
ABSTRACT
For a debtor to obtain a discharge of student loans in bankruptcy,
the debtor must establish that repayment of the loans would impose
an undue hardship. This Article presents the results of an empirical
study of bankruptcy court doctrine over a ten-year period that involved undue hardship discharge proceedings where the court reported information on the debtor’s health status, monthly household
income, and monthly household expenses. The data show that a medical condition increased a debtor’s odds of being granted a discharge
by 140%, but that household income and expense levels did not have a
statistically significant association with legal outcome. These results
suggest that a great deal of bankruptcy court doctrine regarding the
discharge of educational debt has given a meaning to the statutory
term “undue hardship” that is far removed from financial indicia of
ability to repay. As a consequence, the statute has not been given its
proper reach and has failed to achieve its proper sorting function—
that is, identifying those debtors without a meaningful ability to repay their educational debt.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, Michelle Lacey and I reported the results of an empirical
study of the application of bankruptcy court doctrine over a ten-year
period in determinations involving the discharge of educational debt
(the 2005 study).1 The data showed that remarkably few statistically
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University. I am grateful to Christopher Cotropia, David Hoffman, Jonathan Nash, and Nina Pardo for their helpful suggestions. This
Article also benefited from the commentary of participants at the 2007 Federal Judicial
Center’s Workshop for Bankruptcy Judges II and a faculty workshop at Seattle University
School of Law.
1. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts:
An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405
(2005).
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significant differences existed between those debtors granted and
denied a discharge. We concluded that the outcome in the analyzed
cases could best be explained as the product of differing judicial perceptions of how the same legal standard—undue hardship—applied
to relatively similarly situated debtors.
This Article revisits the data from the 2005 study and explores
whether some of the differences between debtors granted and denied
a discharge can account for the legal outcome in a particular subset
of cases. Part II provides a brief overview of the 2005 study, including its salient findings. Part III discusses the subset of cases that
have been identified for further study in this Article and then presents the results from a statistical analysis that seeks to predict the
outcome in undue hardship discharge determinations according to
three factual circumstances: (1) the debtor’s monthly household income, (2) the debtor’s monthly household expenses, and (3) the
debtor’s health. Part IV interprets the results and argues that a
great deal of bankruptcy court doctrine has been misguided in its effort to classify debtors who have an ability to repay their educational
debt.
II. THE 2005 STUDY
The 2005 study drew its data from 261 published and unpublished
opinions that were issued during the ten-year period beginning on
October 7, 1993 and ending on October 6, 2003 and that involved discharge determinations of educational debt pursuant to the undue
hardship standard.2 Since some of these opinions involved multiple
discharge determinations, the data consisted of 286 discharge determinations.3 The study tracked the demographic and financial characteristics of the debtors who sought to discharge their educational
debt with two goals in mind: (1) describing the type of individual who
sought a discharge in order to gain a sense of the degree of hardship
faced by such an individual,4 and (2) comparing differences between
those debtors granted and those debtors denied a discharge in order
to identify the factual circumstances that courts deemed to constitute
undue hardship.5 These characteristics revealed that the majority of
the debtors in the study had confronted financial hardship at the
time they requested a discharge and “did not have a reasonable pros2. The Bankruptcy Code excepts from discharge certain educational debt unless it
can be established that “excepting such debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue
hardship on the debtor.” 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(8) (LexisNexis 2007); see also id. § 1328(a)(2)
(providing that scope of a Chapter 13 discharge does not include § 523(a)(8) debt).
3. For a detailed discussion of the selection criteria implemented in the 2005 study,
see Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 433-38.
4. Id. at 439-78.
5. Id. at 478-86.
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pect of repaying their educational debt.”6 However, only 45% of these
financially distressed debtors received a discharge.7 In seeking to account for the factual circumstances that would allow a debtor to prevail in a claim of undue hardship, the study found that the demographic and financial characteristics of debtors granted a discharge
and debtors denied a discharge were, for the most part, remarkably
similar.
Various financial indicators suggested that the debtors in the
2005 study did not have a realistic ability to repay their educational
debt. For example, for the opinions in which the court reported the
debtor’s net monthly household income,8 the average debtor’s household generated $2111 per month (in 2003 dollars).9 When converting
this figure to annual household income and comparing it to the
amount of household income defined by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) as the poverty line threshold, the
study found that the average debtor household did not generate sufficient income to double the poverty line threshold.10 Importantly,
when taking into account monthly household expenses, exclusive of
educational debt expenses, the average debtor household had a
monthly deficit of $83.66. Put another way, the average debtor
household did not have any disposable income to devote to repayment of the debtor’s educational debt. The study also found that the
average debtor would have had to devote more than two years’ worth
of net annual household income to repay his or her educational debt
in full. This further suggested that staggering educational debt loads
had placed a severe financial strain on the debtors in the study and
that they had a legitimate need for relief.11

6. Id. at 477-78.
7. Id. at 479.
8. The majority of opinions featured in the 2005 study reported a debtor’s income in
terms of net income. Id. at 457. The 2005 study theorized that net income constituted the
debtor’s current monthly gross wages, salary, and commissions reduced by the amount of
any payroll deductions, such as payroll taxes, social security, insurance, and union dues.
Id. at 453.
9. All dollar amounts reported in this Article are in 2003 dollars.
10. The 2004 HHS poverty guidelines, which were used in the 2005 study to calculate
the ratio of the debtor’s annual household income to the poverty line threshold, see Pardo
& Lacey, supra note 1, at 462, defined the poverty line for the contiguous United States as
a household with income of $9310 for the first member and $3180 for each additional
member. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 7336, 7336 (Feb. 13,
2004). Accordingly, for an individual in a single-member household, the inability to generate sufficient income to double the poverty line threshold would mean that his or her annual household income was less than $18,620. Such proximity to the poverty line conjures
the image of a debtor living a marginal existence. It seems reasonable to conclude that
such an individual would not be well poised to make educational debt payments.
11. This measure assumes that household income would remain constant, that the
educational debt would not increase by virtue of interest or other charges, and that the
debtor’s household would live expense free. For a summary of the financial characteristics
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To identify the factual circumstances associated with the grant of
an undue hardship discharge, the study compared the demographic
and financial characteristics of debtors granted a discharge (the discharge group) and debtors denied a discharge (the nondischarge
group). Surprisingly, there were more similarities than dissimilarities between the two groups. Both groups had similar compositions in
terms of the debtor’s gender, age, marital status, number of dependents, employment status, occupation type, and level of educational
attainment.12 The only statistically significant demographic differences between the two groups related to three health-related characteristics. First, the discharge group had a greater percentage of unhealthy debtors: 72% compared to 54% for the nondischarge group.
Second, for the subset of debtors with a medical condition, the discharge group had a greater percentage of debtors whose medical condition limited their ability to work: 49% compared to 25% for the nondischarge group. Third, for the subset of debtors with dependents,
the discharge group had a higher percentage of debtors responsible
for an unhealthy family member: 86% compared to 42% for the nondischarge group.13
With respect to financial characteristics, the study also documented more similarities than dissimilarities between the discharge
group and the nondischarge group. The study did find that the median monthly household income and median monthly household expenses of the discharge group were statistically significantly lower
than the nondischarge group. Specifically, the discharge group had a
median monthly household income of $1623 in comparison to $2072
for the nondischarge group, and the discharge group had median
monthly household expenses of $1837 in comparison to $2313 for the
nondischarge group. However, no statistically significant differences
existed with respect to median levels of monthly disposable household income, educational debt, or the ratio of educational debt to annual household income.14 On the basis of these findings, the study
concluded that the law had been inconsistently applied to relatively
similarly situated debtors,15 and it subsequently demonstrated
through statistical modeling that the outcome of undue hardship discharge determinations in the study could be described as the product
of varying judicial perceptions of the meaning of undue hardship.16

of the debtors in the 2005 study, see Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 454 tbl.1, and for a
detailed discussion of these characteristics, see id. at 452-76.
12. Id. at 482 tbl.4, 483 tbls.5 & 6.
13. Id. at 485 tbl.8.
14. Id. at 484 tbl.7.
15. Id. at 486.
16. Id. at 486-509.

2008]

ILLNESS AND INABILITY TO REPAY

509

Although the 2005 study revealed that a limited number of factual
circumstances were associated with the outcome of the undue hardship discharge determinations, it did not seek to fit a statistical
model that would predict outcome according to these circumstances
for two reasons. First, not all of the discharge determinations in the
study reported sufficient information to document these circumstances. For example, notwithstanding the statistically significant
relationship between a debtor’s monthly household income and a
court’s decision to grant an undue hardship discharge, approximately
15% of the discharge determinations did not report sufficient information on monthly household income.17 Second, some of the statistically significant factual circumstances were limited to an extremely
narrow subset of discharge determinations. For example, the relationship between the health status of a debtor’s dependents and the
outcome of the discharge determination could only be explored for
those discharge determinations involving debtors with dependents—
specifically, only 56% of all discharge determinations.18 Moreover,
only half of these determinations provided sufficiently detailed information to document the health status of a debtor’s dependents.19
Accordingly, the relationship between this factor and legal outcome
could only have been explored in 28% of the discharge determinations. Because of these constraints, the statistical modeling in the
study instead focused on the conclusions reached by the court with
respect to the distinct doctrinal factors that constituted the ultimate
holding on undue hardship.20 This Article now seeks to explore what,
if anything, statistical modeling based on certain factual characteristics will tell us about the application of the undue hardship standard
in a subset of discharge determinations from the 2005 study.
III. REVISITING UNDUE HARDSHIP IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
The 2005 study emphasized that, since its data were drawn only
from undue hardship discharge opinions disseminated to Westlaw
over a ten-year period,21 it could not be claimed that the data were
representative of the manner in which courts adjudicated all dis17. Id. at 484 tbl.7.
18. Id. at 482 tbl.4.
19. Id. at 485 tbl.8.
20. The study modeled the decisionmaking process according to three core legal considerations—the debtor’s current inability to repay, the debtor’s future inability to repay,
and the debtor’s good faith effort to repay—of which at least one was referenced in each
discharge determination in the study. As a result, the statistical model classified all of the
discharge determinations in the study. The study then sought to determine the factual circumstances relevant for assessing each of those considerations, yet once again found that
factual circumstances played a limited role in accounting for the legal conclusions reached
by courts. Id. at 486-509.
21. Id. at 410 & n.21.
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charge determinations during that time period.22 In light of that limitation, one might question the value of empirical analysis of a subset
of these data. The answer is simply this: If evidence of associations
between certain factual characteristics and legal outcomes can be established for a large subset of the data, even when controlling for
other factors, the emerging patterns will reveal what influenced a
large number of bankruptcy courts in reaching their dispositions. In
turn, the propriety of such associations can be evaluated from both a
normative perspective and a practical perspective. Normatively
speaking, if past experience demonstrates that courts have inappropriately allowed certain facts to give content and meaning to the
phrase “undue hardship,” or alternatively have failed to give certain
facts their due weight, then prescriptions can be made that will guide
future decisionmakers in giving proper reach to the law. Practically
speaking, if past patterns serve a signaling function to future litigants regarding the likelihood of relief in undue hardship discharge
determinations,23 or for that matter future decisionmakers, then the
effect and desirability of such signals should be assessed.
This Part presents the results from a binary logistic regression
model used to predict whether a bankruptcy court granted a debtor
an undue hardship discharge based on the following independent
variables: (1) the debtor’s monthly household income, (2) the debtor’s
monthly household expenses, and (3) the debtor’s health status. Approximately 60% of the discharge determinations in the dataset from
2005 study had information for each of these variables.24 The analysis that follows seeks to ascertain whether the associations discovered in the 2005 study with respect to each of these variables persist
when the variables are jointly incorporated into a statistical model.

22. Id. at 433-34.
23. See Bernard Trujillo, Regulating Bankruptcy Abuse: An Empirical Study of Consumer Exemptions Cases, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 561, 574 (2006) (noting in an empirical study of bankruptcy court doctrine in consumer exemptions proceedings over a
twenty-year period that “patterns [across a large number of cases] tell us not only what
particular judges accomplished in specific cases, but also what courts have signaled to future litigants about . . . debtors’ chance of success” (footnote omitted)).
24. Of the 286 discharge determinations in the dataset from the 2005 study, 175 included information for the debtor’s health, monthly household income, and monthly household expenses. However, any observation involving a debtor with an extreme amount of
monthly household income or monthly household expenses was omitted from the statistical
model in this Article. For this subset of debtors, any debtor with monthly household income that fell above the third quartile ($2715.47) of the household income data by more
than three times the interquartile range ($1531.90) for such data was deemed to be an extreme outlier. In similar fashion, any debtor with monthly household expenses that fell
above the third quartile ($2762.82) of the household expense data by more than three
times the interquartile range ($1472.82) for such data was deemed to be an extreme outlier. Three extreme outliers were identified on the basis of monthly household income and
none on the basis of monthly household expenses. Thus, the statistical analyses in this Article are based on 172 discharge determinations.
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The data show that the financial indicators have no statistically significant effect on the outcome of the discharge determination. On the
other hand, a debtor’s health status is a statistically significant predictor of outcome: If a debtor suffered from a medical condition, the
existence of that condition increased the debtor’s chances of being
granted a discharge. A detailed discussion of these findings now follows.
Overall, the model is statistically significant as compared to a
model without independent variables, and it correctly predicts the
outcome in approximately 63% of the discharge determinations.25 Of
course, without referring to any of the independent variables in the
model, one could correctly classify the outcome in some of these determinations by assigning the most-frequent category of outcome
(i.e., the marginal distribution of the dependent variable) to all of the
determinations. In this case, one could correctly classify the outcome
in 52% of the discharge determinations by guessing nondischarge for
all determinations.26 Thus, when predicting with the model that includes the independent variables of the debtor’s monthly household
income and expenses, as well as the debtor’s health status, the error
rate drops by approximately 22% (i.e., the adjusted count R2) compared to a prediction based solely on the marginal distribution of the
dependent variable.
When controlling for the effect of all other variables in the model,
only the debtor’s health status remains a statistically significant
predictor of an undue hardship discharge. In other words, for these
discharge determinations, no relationship existed between discharge
and a debtor’s monthly household income or household expenses. The
question arises then as to the size of the effect a debtor’s health had
upon a court’s propensity to grant an undue hardship discharge. The
model indicates that suffering from a medical condition made a
debtor’s odds of being granted a discharge 2.40 times higher.27 Put
another way, holding all other variables constant, the existence of a
medical condition increased the debtor’s odds of being granted a discharge by 140%.28
These findings can further be interpreted using predicted probabilities. Using the actual values for all of the independent variables
25. For any observation for which the model predicted a probability of over 50% for
the outcome of discharge, the model assigned the positive outcome of discharge; for any observation for which the model predicted a probability of under 50%, the model assigned the
negative outcome of nondischarge.
26. For the 172 observations included in the regression model, the court denied a discharge in 90 of those observations.
27. It can be said with 95% certainty that this figure could be as low as 1.27 times and
as high as 4.52 times.
28. It can be said with 95% certainty that this figure could be as low as 27% and as a
high as 352%.
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included in the model, the predicted probability of discharge is calculated. Figure 1 below presents the predicted probabilities for discharge in the actual observations in the regression model through
use of a histogram that separately displays the distribution of those
probabilities for healthy debtors and unhealthy debtors. The width of
each bar represents a specific interval of the predicted probability of
discharge, and the height of each bar represents the percentage of
discharge determinations that fall within that interval. For any observation with a predicted probability of over 50% (i.e., greater than
0.5), the model assigned the positive outcome of discharge. A comparison of the two distributions reveals that, whereas approximately
86% of the determinations involving unhealthy debtors had greater
than a 50% predicted probability of a discharge being granted, only
4% of the determinations involving healthy debtors did so.
FIGURE 1

PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF DISCHARGE BY
DEBTOR HEALTH STATUS
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Probabilities of discharge for hypothetical sets of values can also
be predicted. For example, holding monthly household income and
expenses at their mean values (respectively, $2018 and $2158), the
probability of an unhealthy debtor being granted a discharge is pre-
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dicted to be approximately 57%,29 whereas for a healthy debtor it is
predicted to be 35%.30 Accordingly, the presence of a medical condition is predicted to have increased the likelihood of discharge for a
debtor with average income and expenses by twenty-two percentage
points.
On the basis of these data, it is clear that the status of a debtor’s
health greatly influenced a court’s decision to grant an undue hardship discharge in 60% of the discharge determinations from the 2005
study. How should one interpret the primacy of a debtor’s health
status in influencing the outcome in over half of the discharge determinations documented in opinions issued by bankruptcy courts
from the end of 1993 through the end of 2003? Moreover, what importance should be given to the failure of financial considerations
(i.e., monthly household income and household expenses) to play an
explanatory role in ascertaining whether the nondischarge of educational debt would impose an undue hardship on a debtor? Part IV
seeks to answer these questions.
IV. RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF DEBTOR HEALTH IN THE
DISCHARGE OF EDUCATIONAL DEBT
This Part interprets the results from the regression analysis presented in Part III. In doing so, it assesses the effectiveness of the
manner in which bankruptcy court doctrine has functioned to resolve
the issue of the discharge of educational debt. Again, it should be
emphasized that this Article does not purport to provide a definitive
or exhaustive account of such doctrine. The data only represent 60%
of a decade’s worth of undue hardship opinions—a snapshot in time.
Accordingly, caution must be exercised in drawing inferences regarding the representativeness of such data with respect to bankruptcy
court doctrine on the topic that has subsequently emerged. Keeping
these limitations in mind, it is not an unreasonable proposition to
think that the past practice has informed the manner in which bankruptcy judges continue to apply the doctrine that elaborates on the
meaning of undue hardship, especially as there have not been any
recent seismic shifts in the doctrine prompted by hierarchical mandates from the U.S. Courts of Appeals or the Supreme Court. By focusing on patterns that have emerged over time and discerning their
import, a more concrete understanding of the doctrine can be
achieved than if one were to analyze a handful of opinions in isolation.
29. It can be said with 95% certainty that this figure could be approximately as low as
47% and no higher than approximately 67%.
30. It can be said with 95% certainty that this figure could be approximately as low as
24% and no higher than approximately 46%.
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In order to understand why a debtor’s illness has played a substantive role in giving meaning to the term “undue hardship,” a brief
discussion of the doctrinal framework bankruptcy courts have
adopted to implement the standard is necessary. Since the Bankruptcy Code fails to define the term,31 courts have formulated tests to
apply the standard. In Brunner v. New York State Higher Education
Services Corp.,32 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals articulated a
three-part test (the Brunner test) for undue hardship that requires a
debtor to establish:
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist
for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student
loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay
the loans.33

With the formal adoption of this framework by eight other federal
regional circuits,34 this framework has become the dominant mode for
analyzing a debtor’s claim of undue hardship. Some courts, however,
have implemented the “totality of the circumstances” test (the totality test), which “requires an analysis of (1) the debtor’s past, present,
and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) calculation of
the debtor’s and his dependents’ reasonable necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding that particular bankruptcy case.”35 This approach has been endorsed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,36 as well as by courts
within the First Circuit,37 although the First Circuit Court of Appeals
has not formally adopted an analytical framework for applying the

31. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 101 (LexisNexis 2007).
32. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
33. Id. at 396.
34. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400
(4th Cir. 2005); Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir.
2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); U.S.
Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); Hemar Ins.
Corp. of Am. v. Cox (In re Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003); United Student Aid
Funds, Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998); Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Roberson, 999
F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993).
35. Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 139
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999).
36. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2003).
37. See, e.g., Brunell v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A. (In re Brunell), 356 B.R. 567, 575-76
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); Lamanna v. EFS Servs., Inc. (In re Lamanna), 285 B.R. 347, 353
(Bankr. D.R.I. 2002); Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 741 (Bankr. D.
Me. 2000).
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undue hardship standard.38 Courts have made a debtor’s health a
relevant factor under both approaches, and this bears further examination given that the overwhelming majority of courts in the discharge determinations analyzed in this Article implemented one of
these two approaches, with 70% applying the Brunner test and 21%
applying the totality test.39
Under the second prong of the Brunner test, a debtor must establish that additional circumstances exist indicating that the debtor’s
inability to maintain a minimal standard of living will persist for a
significant portion of the repayment period of the educational debt.40
Courts that have applied the test have considered a debtor’s illness
to be one type of additional circumstance that would support a finding of a future inability to repay.41 Similarly, under the totality test,
courts have considered a debtor’s illness as one of several relevant
factors in assessing undue hardship.42 Some have done so under the
first prong of the test, which examines the debtor’s past, present, and
reasonably reliable future financial resources.43 Others have done so
pursuant to the third prong of the test, which examines any other
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the debtor’s case.44

38. See Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir.
2006) (“We see no need in this case to pronounce our views of a preferred method of identifying a case of ‘undue hardship.’ ”). Neither has the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
First Circuit formally adopted the “totality of the circumstances” test. See Smith v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Smith), 328 B.R. 605, 611 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005).
39. It should be noted that neither test proved to be more forgiving than the other for
the discharge determinations analyzed in this Article. Approximately half of the debtors
whose undue hardship claim was analyzed pursuant to the Brunner test received a discharge, whereas approximately 44% of the debtors whose undue hardship claim was analyzed pursuant to the totality test received a discharge. This difference is not statistically
significant.
40. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385-86
(6th Cir. 2005); Triplett v. ACS/PNC Educ. Loan Ctr. (In re Triplett), 357 B.R. 739, 743
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006); Simmons v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Simmons), No. 06-3012, 2006
WL 2556581, at *2 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2006); Clark v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re
Clark), 341 B.R. 238, 253 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); Mosley v. Gen. Revenue Corp. (In re
Mosley), 330 B.R. 832, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005); Lowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In
re Lowe), 321 B.R. 852, 859 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004); Folsom v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re
Folsom), 315 B.R. 161, 165 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004); Hafner v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp.
(In re Hafner), 303 B.R. 351, 356 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003); Hoskins v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. (In re Hoskins), 292 B.R. 883, 887 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003); Pace v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. (In re Pace), 288 B.R. 788, 792 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003); Thoms v. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. (In re Thoms), 257 B.R. 144, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); Jones v. Nat’l Payment Ctr. (In re Jones), 242 B.R. 321, 326 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998).
42. See, e.g., Anelli v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Anelli), 262 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2000).
43. See, e.g., Limkemann v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Limkemann), 314 B.R. 190, 19495 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004).
44. See, e.g., Albee v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Albee), 338 B.R. 407, 410-11, 413
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2006).
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Notwithstanding that a debtor’s health is a relevant consideration
under current doctrine, should it be so, and, if so, what weight should
be afforded to it? Answering whether a debtor’s health should be a
relevant consideration in the undue hardship inquiry necessarily involves figuring out its relationship to a debtor’s ability to repay his or
her educational debt. Courts have observed that, since illness can
negatively impact a debtor’s ability to work, a debtor who suffers
from a medical condition may not be well poised to generate sufficient income in the future to repay his or her educational debt.45
This, however, is only one way in which a medical condition may
prevent repayment. Uninsured medical costs have been documented
to be one of the leading causes of bankruptcy filings,46 and, perhaps
not surprisingly, many of the opinions in the 2005 study contained
references to debtors who could not afford health insurance.47 In light
of these considerations, it seems eminently reasonable to conclude
that the status of a debtor’s health should play a role in an undue
hardship discharge determination. But should it play as central a
role as it did in 60% of the doctrine that emerged from bankruptcy
courts in the decade spanning 1993 to 2003?
At its core, an undue hardship discharge determination seeks to
answer whether the debtor requesting relief will have the ability to
repay his or her educational debt without suffering impermissible
sacrifice—namely, undue hardship.48 This, of course, requires a court
45. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1311 (10th Cir.
2004) (noting that “a permanent medical condition will certainly contribute to the unlikelihood of a debtor earning enough money to repay her student loan debt”); In re Clark, 341
B.R. at 253 (“[A] strong nexus between the medical condition and its adverse effect on the
debtor’s employment, specifically the debtor’s income, must be demonstrated. If health
problems contribute to a debtor’s sub-minimal standard of living, then the prospect for recovery and defrayal of medical expenses within the repayment period are relevant.” (citation omitted)); cf. In re Hafner, 303 B.R. at 356 (“The focus is whether the medical conditions are so serious that a debtor’s ability to repay is impaired for the duration of the obligation. . . . What matters is the effect that impairment has upon a debtor’s ability to obtain
and sustain adequate financial resources in the future.”).
46. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 141-71 (2000); Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth
Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535 (2006); Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan &
Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the
Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001).
47. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 448 & n.192. For an example of a court that
has recognized that medical costs borne by the debtor may support a claim of undue hardship, albeit under a narrow set of circumstances, see Wilson v. Missouri Higher Education
Loan Authority (In re Wilson), 177 B.R. 246, 248 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994) (“ ‘Undue hardship’ must mean more than unpleasantness associated with repayment of a just debt. Generally, there must be a showing of exceptional or unique circumstances—e.g., that the
debtor must bear the burden of heavy medical expenses while living at the poverty
level . . . .” (emphasis added)).
48. Put another way, “the undue hardship examination should have as its essential
starting point one simple question: Is there a reasonable prospect that the debtor will ever
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to predict on the basis of a variety of factors the likelihood that the
financial distress suffered by the debtor will persist into the future.49
As suggested by the 2005 study, very few factual circumstances appeared to be associated with the outcome of discharge determinations.50 Further statistical analysis has revealed that, of the three
most prevalent factors (i.e., the debtor’s health status, monthly
household income, and monthly household expenses), only a debtor’s
health status had a statistically significant association with legal
outcome.51 As outlined above, this factor should have an effect on legal outcome,52 but it should not be the only factor that does so.
be able to repay . . . ?” Mallinckrodt v. Chem. Bank (In re Mallinckrodt), 260 B.R. 892, 898
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001), rev’d, 274 B.R. 560 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
49. See Lieberman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Lieberman), Bankr. No. 0050978, Adv. No. 02-5018, 2003 WL 21397713, at *9 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 3, 2003) (“Simply stated, one must take the debtor in an educational-loan dischargeability proceeding exactly as he presents himself, vocational profile, medical condition, net worth, actual earnings, family responsibilities, and all. Then, one must make a reasonable prognostication as
to the debtor’s future ability to generate a meaningful income surplus.”).
50. See supra Part II.
51. See supra Part III.
52. It bears mentioning that formal incorporation of a debtor’s health status into the
analytical framework for analyzing undue hardship may have produced an unintended
consequence—namely, making it more difficult for debtors who claim undue hardship on
the basis of illness to satisfy their burden of proof. While some courts do not require a
debtor to produce expert testimony to corroborate the existence of a medical condition, see,
e.g., Hoskins v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hoskins), 292 B.R. 883, 887-88 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 2003); Mayer v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Mayer), 198 B.R. 116,
121 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), others have intimated that such testimony may be required for a debtor to satisfy his or her burden of proof, see, e.g., Burkhead v. United States
(In re Burkhead), 304 B.R. 560, 565 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (“Although the Debtor testified
about the seriousness of her medical condition and modest living arrangements, she did
not call any expert witnesses to testify about her long-term prognosis.”); VanderMast v.
Educ. Res. Inst. (In re VanderMast), Bankr. No. 00-13445-JMD, Adv. No. 01-1074-JMD,
2002 WL 1402535, at *7 (Bankr. D.N.H. June 27, 2002) (“The Debtor did testify about her
health problems and her testimony indicates that she expects her health problems to continue into the future. However, the Debtor did not present any evidence from a medical expert regarding the Debtor’s prospects of recovery and ability to return to a more normal
lifestyle.”); Kelsey v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Kelsey), 287 B.R. 132, 143
(Bankr. D. Vt. 2001) (“[T]his Court closely scrutinizes claims for undue hardship based on
psychological or emotional disability due to the susceptibility of such claims to fabrication,
exaggeration and fraud. Well qualified and substantiated expert testimony is essential.”);
cf. Craig Peyton Gaumer, Use Expert Witness Testimony in Student Loan Hardship Discharge Litigation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2004, at 8 (arguing that the Federal Rules of
Evidence require expert testimony to support an undue hardship claim based on medical
conditions). Given that debtors who seek an undue hardship discharge are likely to lack
the resources necessary to litigate the matter generally, see 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N,
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 212 (1997) (“It hardly is surprising that some
courts see few requests for hardship discharges of educational loans given the pitfalls of
the undue hardship standard. The borrowers most likely to prevail in many courts are
those with the least possibility of being able to litigate the question. The risk of losing is
also high. Failure to meet the burden of proof leaves the debtor with the student loan debts
and substantial litigation expenses.” (footnote omitted)), courts have recognized the paradox that arises from a rule requiring debtors to present expert testimony, which entails
more financial resources, to support an undue hardship claim based on a medical condi-
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At bottom, financial characteristics should play a dominant role.
The amounts an individual has earned and spent in the past should
be probative of ability to repay—at least as much as the health
status of that individual, if not more so. In fact, in order to identify
those debtors who should not be eligible for Chapter 7 relief because
of their ability to repay prebankruptcy debts, Congress has placed
emphasis on the predictive power of past financial considerations by
creating a means test structured around the concept of “current
monthly income,”53 an amount based on an historical six-month average of the debtor’s income.54 While this is not to say that bankruptcy
courts ought to implement a formulaic approach in structuring their
inquiry into a debtor’s ability to repay pursuant to the undue hardship standard, courts must start applying the standard in such a way
that financial criteria have a statistically significant bearing on legal
outcome.
One way to do so would be to adopt an approach similar to the
statutory presumption of undue hardship that arises in the context of
reaffirmation agreements when a debtor’s disposable income is less
than the scheduled payments on the reaffirmed debt.55 While it has
been argued elsewhere that this presumption should inform the
meaning of undue hardship in the educational debt context,56 that is
not the point here. Rather, the suggestion is offered as one way in
which uniformity could be brought to the doctrine by focusing on certain financial criteria.57 If courts were to adopt such an approach, one
would expect to witness a statistically significant relationship between a debtor’s disposable income and the legal outcome of the discharge determination. The point remains, however, that financial indicia of ability to repay have not been associated with legal outcome,
and that is troubling. A closer examination of the financial indicators
in the discharge determinations analyzed in this Article reveals how

tion, see, e.g., Burton v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Burton), 339 B.R. 856, 877 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2006) (“Cases that involve debtors that lack the resources to pay experts to testify
at trial as to debtors’ medical conditions undoubtably [sic] create a paradox.”); Doherty v.
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Doherty), 219 B.R. 665, 669 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998)
(noting that “dischargeability litigation involves real persons who are debtors under the
Bankruptcy Code, and cannot afford to hire medical experts to testify to the effect of their
disease on their earning capacity”); Sands v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In re Sands),
166 B.R. 299, 311 n.22 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994).
53. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).
54. See id. § 101(10A)(A).
55. See id. § 524(m)(1).
56. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 510-14.
57. Another possibility would be for courts to focus on the debtor’s income in relation
to the federal poverty guidelines, an approach introduced by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania but ultimately rejected by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. See id. at 521 n.447.
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bankruptcy courts have failed to sort debtors based on ability to repay.
Since courts have interpreted congressional intent underlying the
undue hardship discharge provision to be the prevention of abuse of
the bankruptcy system by student loan debtors,58 it is useful to assess how well bankruptcy courts have performed the sorting function
by reference to the statute’s perceived purpose. Whether a bankruptcy court effectuates the statute’s perceived purpose can be understood as a function of the relationship between (1) the type of
debtor (based on repayment ability) making a claim of undue hardship and (2) the outcome of the debtor’s discharge determination. Table 1 depicts this relationship.59
TABLE 1: THE SORTING FUNCTION OF UNDUE HARDSHIP
DISCHARGE DETERMINATION OUTCOME

DEBTOR TYPE

(1) Able to Repay

(2) Unable to Repay

(A) Discharge Granted

(B) Discharge Denied

Improper Sorting

Proper Sorting

Proper Sorting

Improper Sorting

Assuming that, by establishing the undue hardship threshold,
Congress truly sought to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system by
student loan debtors, then only debtors with an ability to repay (Row
1) should be a legitimate target of the undue hardship provision—
that is, all such debtors should be denied an undue hardship discharge. Debtors who are unable to repay their educational debt (Row
2) should be beyond the reach of the statute. Accordingly, bankruptcy
courts properly execute the sorting function when they deny a discharge to debtors who have an ability to repay (Cell B1) and grant a
discharge to debtors who have an inability to repay (Cell A2). Conversely, they improperly execute the sorting function when they
grant a discharge to debtors who have an ability to repay (Cell A1)
and deny a discharge to debtors who have an inability to repay (Cell
B2).

58. It should be noted that the historical record suggests an absence of unequivocal
intent to this effect. See id. at 419-28.
59. This approach is derived from Trujillo, supra note 23, at 572-74.
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As a thought experiment, let us postulate that a debtor with the
following profile would be a prime candidate for being deemed to
have an ability to repay his or her educational debt: a debtor (1) with
disposable income, (2) whose household generates sufficient income
to double the poverty line threshold, and (3) who would have to devote one year’s worth or less of household income to repay his or her
educational debt in full.60 Using this profile as a metric of repayment
ability, how did bankruptcy courts perform the sorting function in
the 172 discharge determinations analyzed in this Article? Table 2
presents the results, listing the actual numbers with the cell percentages in parentheses.
TABLE 2:
SORTING UNDUE HARDSHIP DEBTORS:
A HYPOTHETICAL CONSTRUCT
DISCHARGE DETERMINATION OUTCOME

DEBTOR TYPE

(A) Discharge Granted

(B) Discharge Denied

(1) Able to Repay

2
(1.16)

9
(5.23)

(2) Unable to Repay

80
(46.51)

81
(47.09)

60. The use of financial indicators such as these to predict repayment ability should
be accompanied by an inquiry into the amount of time that the repayment obligation has
been outstanding. Because the indicators represent a financial snapshot, they may produce
a distorted picture. The amount of time that the debtor has had an obligation to repay but
failed to do so can help illuminate whether there has been a distortion. This type of evidence allows an assessment of whether the financial indicators are consistent with an historical inability to repay.
The undue hardship opinions in the 2005 study generally did not provide sufficiently
detailed information to account for the amount of time that the debtor’s repayment obligation had been due and owing. A rough approximation can be obtained, however, by considering the debtor’s age in relation to the level of educational attainment. For the 172 discharge determinations analyzed in this Article, 125 determinations (73%) provided sufficiently detailed information to code for the debtor’s age and educational attainment. The
average age for this subset of debtors was 41.5 years old, and the median age was 41 years
old. Since the majority of these debtors (61%) did not obtain a level of education higher
than a bachelor’s degree, it seems reasonable to conclude that many of the debtors had
been in repayment status for quite some time.
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It should be noted that, pursuant to the repayment metric defined
above, only 6% of the debtors should have been deemed to have an
ability to repay, which would mean that the other 94% litigated over
a provision that was not intended to apply to them. While it may be
argued that this repayment metric defines ability to repay too narrowly, it should be noted that, of the analyzed discharge determinations that reached a legal conclusion regarding a debtor’s current
ability to repay,61 85% concluded that the debtor did not have such an
ability.
As Table 1 indicated, the outcomes in Cells A2 and B1 represent
proper application of the statute. Accordingly, under this hypothetical construct, courts gave the undue hardship standard its proper
reach in slightly more than half of the discharge determinations. On
the other hand, approximately 48% of the determinations (Cells A1
and B2) entailed an improper sorting of debtors. Perhaps most striking, all but two of those determinations involved nonabusive student
loan debtors. For the 81 debtors with an inability to repay who were
nonetheless denied a discharge (Cell B2), the average debtor in this
group lived in a household that had a monthly deficit of $153, a
household whose income was only 1.8 times that of the poverty line
threshold, and a household that would have had to devote 2.7 years’
worth of its income to repay the debtor’s educational debt in full.62
Thus, while courts were effective gatekeepers in preventing abuse of
the bankruptcy system, it would appear they cast an overly broad net
that captured a significant number of debtors in true need of financial relief.63
Perhaps these findings should not be so surprising. Empirical evidence exists that bankruptcy courts have not been successful in predicting a debtor’s future repayment ability in a different context—
Chapter 13. In Chapter 13, a debtor generally receives a discharge
61. There were 163 such discharge determinations.
62. The financial characteristics of the average debtor in the discharge group that
would be deemed to have an inability to repay based on the postulated repayment metric
(Cell A2) are only slightly worse. The average debtor in this group lived in a household
with a monthly deficit of $222 and with income that was only 1.5 times that of the poverty
line threshold. On the other hand, one might conclude that this group was better off given
that the average debtor’s household would have had to devote 2.3 years’ worth of its income (i.e., less than the nondischarge group) to repay the debtor’s educational debt in full.
63. This echoes one of the conclusions of the 2005 study:
While bankruptcy courts have perceived the Bankruptcy Code’s
undue hardship provision to have been enacted by Congress as a necessary measure to curb abuse of the bankruptcy system, the data have
shown that the statute has proved to be much less selective, primarily
because of its inherently overbroad scope. The inevitable result has
been a law applied, counter to its purported objective, to a class of individual whose behavior could not have been deemed by Congress to be a
legitimate target for legislative reform.
Pardo & Lacey, supra note 1, at 479.
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after completing a repayment plan pursuant to which a portion of his
or her future income has been devoted to repaying the claims of
creditors.64 In order for a debtor’s repayment plan to be confirmed,
the court must make a finding of financial feasibility, including that
“the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan.”65
Thus, all confirmed Chapter 13 plans embody the court’s judgment
that the debtor’s repayment efforts over no longer than a five-year
period will succeed.66
A recent empirical study of Chapter 13 documented that, of the
613 confirmed cases in the study’s sample, 351 of those cases were either dismissed or converted to Chapter 7.67 In other words, bankruptcy courts erroneously determined the financial feasibility of future repayment by the debtor in 57% of the confirmed cases. If bankruptcy courts cannot properly gauge repayment ability in the relatively controlled environment of Chapter 13 where various constituencies with different stakes are given the opportunity to object to
plan confirmation,68 where the repayment plan may be modified after
confirmation in response to changed circumstances,69 and where the
repayment period will not exceed five years, then why should they
fare any better in undue hardship discharge determinations that require them to forecast repayment ability over a period that can be as
long as thirty years?
For a judge, there may be an intuitive appeal to focus on a
debtor’s health in assessing repayment ability insofar as it may be
easier to validate internally the prediction of inability to repay. We
have all witnessed someone who has suffered from a medical condition and the manner in which it can interfere with everyday living.
But courts should be cautious not to rely too much on a debtor’s
health as a proxy for repayment ability. As illustrated above, reference to a debtor’s medical condition as part of the undue hardship
inquiry may result in the improper sorting of debtors. Moreover, a
debtor’s health as the major determinant of a finding of undue hardship raises serious concerns about judicial activism. While no court
has announced a per se rule that suffering from a medical condition
constitutes undue hardship, the legal doctrine studied in this Article
approaches this decision standard. Were courts to adopt such an outcome-determinative rule, it would impermissibly encroach into the

64. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1328(a) (LexisNexis 2007).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2000) (emphasis added).
66. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1322(d).
67. See Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 506 tbl.19 (2006).
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (granting trustee and unsecured creditors standing to
object to Chapter 13 plan).
69. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 1329(a).
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legislative sphere by creating a categorical class of debtor entitled to
an undue hardship discharge.70 Lest bankruptcy courts exceed the
scope of their judicial power, it is imperative that other determinants
give content to the meaning of undue hardship.
V. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy courts have been assigned the unenviable task of predicting the future suffering of individuals who seek relief from their
educational debt. One, and only one, factual circumstance has
emerged in a great deal of bankruptcy court doctrine as the major determinant of the legal outcome in undue hardship discharge proceedings—a debtor’s health status. As a result of this focus, the doctrine
has lost its mooring to the essential question sought to be answered
in such determinations: “Will repayment of the educational debt impose an undue hardship on the debtor?” If past evidence has demonstrated that a debtor has been subject to financial distress at the
time he or she makes a claim for relief, absent positive evidence that
the debtor’s situation will improve, it seems sensible to conclude that
the debtor’s financial situation will persist if relief is not granted.
Notwithstanding the inevitable coordination problem faced by bankruptcy courts that operate in distinct judicial districts and circuits,
the bankruptcy system ought to strive to bring a measure of consis-

70. One need look no further than the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on equitable
subordination in support of this conclusion. In United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535
(1996), and United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213
(1996), the Supreme Court reviewed two separate bankruptcy court decisions that equitably subordinated certain IRS tax penalty claims to the claims of general unsecured creditors, merely on the basis of the nature of the IRS’s claims and not with regard to the individual circumstances of the case. As I have commented previously:
Both cases stand for the proposition that a bankruptcy court may not subordinate categorically whole classes of claims and thereby transgress the
line distinguishing adjudication from legislation. The decisions reflect the
Supreme Court’s concern that any categorical subordination of claims would
exceed the constitutional limits on judicial power and encroach upon Congress’s Article I powers.
Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Note, Beyond the Limits of Equity Jurisprudence: No-Fault Equitable
Subordination, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1494-95 (2000) (footnote omitted). There is every
reason to believe that the Supreme Court would view the creation of a categorical class of
debtors entitled to discharge under the undue hardship standard to be equally impermissible as the categorical subordination of IRS tax penalty claims under the Code’s equitable
subordination provision.
Interestingly, a strand of undue hardship discharge doctrine holds (for all intents and
purposes) that a debtor’s failure to participate in one of the federal government’s repayment plans, such as the income contingent repayment plan, will preclude a finding of undue hardship. See Terrence L. Michael & Janie M. Phelps, “Judges?!—We Don’t Need No
Stinking Judges!!!”: The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Cases and the Income
Contingent Repayment Plan, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 73, 92-94 (2005). A decision standard
such as this would also run afoul of the principles set forth in Noland and Reorganized
CF&I Fabricators.
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tency to the undue hardship doctrine by rooting it in financial predictors of ability to repay.
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APPENDIX
BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL
OF UNDUE HARDSHIP DISCHARGE
VARIABLE

Discharge

Monthly Household Income

0.9995 (0.9990, 1.0000)

Monthly Household Expenses

1.0003 (0.9998, 1.0009)

Debtor Health Status**

2.3961 (1.2691, 4.5240)

Observations

172

Log likelihood

-113.313

McFadden’s R²

0.0481

Note: ***p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Odds ratios presented with 95% confidence interval in parentheses. The dependent variable is whether the court granted
the debtor a discharge, whether in full or in part, with denial of discharge coded 0
and grant of discharge coded 1. The third independent variable (“Debtor Health
Status”) tracks whether the debtor suffered from either a physical or mental condition (or both), with a healthy debtor coded 0 and an unhealthy debtor coded 1.
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